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FAST FOOD AND FALSE FRIENDS IN THE
SHOPPING MALL OF IDEAS
STEVEN L. WINTER*
When I entered law school in 1974, there was little doubt
about the political valence of the First Amendment. Lunch counter
sit-ins, civil rights marches, and anti-war demonstrations were
recent, still vivid lessons in the value of free speech. For proof of
the importance of a free press, we had only to consider the crucial
role of investigative journalists in the Watergate drama or turn to
the Pentagon Papers case.1 In 1974, the decisions in Buckley v.
Valeo2 and the commercial speech cases3 were still two years away;
in fact, not one of the "conservative" First Amendment decisions
catalogued by Professor Schauer had yet been decided.4 For the
left-liberal of that day, the fundamental First Amendment question
was how far to extend the boundaries of freedom of expression.
The radicals among us thought that there should be no boundaries
at all.
Much is different twenty years later. As Schauer remarks, free
speech jurisprudence has become the congenial cohort of corpo-
rations and conservatives.' On the left, advocacy of state regulation
of speech is no longer the isolated heresy of a few radical feminists
like Catharine MacKinnon. 6 Support for more state intervention
has become a mainstay of contemporary First Amendment dis-
course not only for critical race theorists like Richard Delgado,
Mari Matsuda, and Charles Lawrence, 7 but also for mainstream
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 935 (1993).
5. Id. at 948-52.
6. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscoURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 163-97 (1987).
7. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Man J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320 (1989);
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DuKE L.J. 431.
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liberals like Owen Fiss. s The ironic role reversal is nowhere more
clear than in the debate over campus hate speech: Henry Hyde
and William Buckley have become First Amendment paladins;
many who now argue for prohibitions on "offensive speech" are
people who, twenty-five years ago, might have worn Paul Robert
Cohen's slogan on their backs. 9
A shift of this magnitude virtually demands an explanation.
Professor Schauer suggests that, notwithstanding the historic alli-
ance between progressives and First Amendment partisans, the free
speech principle may have had an inherently conservative bias all
along. He points out that in speech, as elsewhere, formal neutrality
favors those who are already the beneficiaries of existing imbal-
ances in economic and social power. Thus, he observes "that the
marketplace of ideas is less metaphor than description, and that
in the marketplace of ideas, like in most other markets, one can
compete much more successfully if one has greater resources."' 0
For Professor Schauer, moreover, this advantage is a logical cor-
ollary of free speech theory and not a mere accident of fortune.
He concludes "that there may be a closer affinity between free
speech libertarianism and economic libertarianism . . . than has
traditionally been supposed.""
The problem with this particular explanation is that it leads
to the historical conundrum with which Professor Schauer closes:
8. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 H~av. L. Rav. 781 (1987); Owen M. Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405 (1986).
9. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) ("On April 26, 1968, the
defendant was observed in the Los Angeles County Courthouse in the corridor outside
division 20 of the municipal court wearing a jacket bearing the words 'Fuck the Draft'
which were plainly visible.").
10. Schauer, supra note 4, at 949. Schauer distinguishes his thesis concerning the
changing political valence of free speech doctrine from that of Jack Balkin, suggesting that
Balkin emphasizes the manipulability of doctrine in a crude legal realist manner. Id. at
944-45; see also J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 383-84. But Balkin develops both of the themes
that Schauer alludes to here. First, Balkin argues that the legal realist attacks on the public/
private distinction and the theoretical coherence of freedom of contract apply with equal
force to freedom of speech. Id. at 383 ("[R]ecent left critiques of traditional liberal first
amendment doctrine bear a striking similarity to the legal realist critique of the favored
right of laissez-faire conservatives, free contract."). Second, he argues that, in the context
of modern communications media, the distribution of wealth has a direct effect on the
distribution of communicative power. Id. at 407 ("To put it bluntly, the more property
one has, the greater one's ability to compete in the marketplace of ideas, just as in the
ordinary marketplace.").
11. Schauer, supra note 4, at 951; but cf. Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 8, at 782-
83 (noting that the First Amendment "has long served as the breeding ground of libertarian
sentiment" and observing that Ronald Coase and Aaron Director had drawn the parallel
between free speech and free market theory as early as 1974 and 1964, respectively).
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"Perhaps the principal question remaining, and one to which there
may be no easy answer, is only about why it took so long.' ' 2
Indeed. If the conceptual connection between free speech and free
markets is as strong and deep as Professor Schauer suggests, one
wonders how it managed to evade both progressives and conser-
vatives for most of this century. If the concept of laissez faire is
the common core of economic and free speech theory, then the
tardy emergence of the First Amendment's inherent conservatism
is a truly daunting enigma.
There is a problem here, but it is methodological rather than
historical. The historical conundrum arises only because Professor
Schauer treats the First Amendment as a monolith that embodies
a single, analytic truth. He believes that there really is something
that, in his own words, can be identified as "the principle of
freedom of speech."' 3 If one embraces an essentialist approach,
reduces free speech to a single value, and concludes that autonomy
(i.e., libertarianism) is that value, then the late appearance of the
First Amendment's conservative tilt does present a difficulty. 4 But
12. Schauer, supra note 4, at 957.
13. Id. at 935, 955-57 (emphasis added). Fiss, in contrast, identifies "the autonomy
principle" and "the public debate principle" as competing candidates for "the mediating
principle that gives fullest expression to [the First Amendment] ideal." Fiss, Why the State?,
supra note 8, at 784-85.
14. In his comments at the conference, Schauer denied the charge of essentialism and
acknowledged the historicity of "the free speech principle." Frederick Schauer, Remarks
at the University of Colorado Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Conference on Constitutional Law:
Freedom of Speech in a World of Private Power, Boulder, Colo. (Mar. 19, 1993); cf.
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PH.osopiucAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DEcIsioN-MAKINo IN LAw AND IN LIFE 58 (1991) (explaining that what he calls
"literal" or "acontextual" meaning need not connote "anything essential or natural or
inexorable," but rather "incorporates substantive moral, social, and political presuppositions
that could be and may yet be otherwise."). The problems with this clarification are two.
First, it necessarily concedes my point: The fact that the First Amendment has only recently
begun to display conservative tendencies presents no particular theoretical difficulty once
one recognizes that "the" principle of free speech is an historical contingency. See infra
text accompanying note 15.
Second, the clarification is not really responsive to the main thrust of my critique. It
is true that Schauer's position is not "essentialist" in the limited sense that it recognizes
the historical contingency of the meaning of free speech. But it remains "essentialist" in
the relevant sense because it assumes that the product of that historical contingency has a
single, discrete character or essence whose meaning does not vary with context. Thus,
Schauer's approach is "essentialist" precisely to the extent that it treats the substance of
the First Amendment as having an intrinsic meaning (and, thus, an inherent conservative
tilt) regardless of the social circumstances in which it operates. In other words, the
clarification notwithstanding, Schauer's view is reductive, monistic, and acontextual. Ac-
cordingly, it remains vulnerable to the pluralist and contextualist critiques. See infra text
accompanying notes 16-22.
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if one takes the view that there is no single or exclusive conception
of free speech, then the conundrum simply disappears.
Although I could very well be mistaken, it seems clear to me
that-as an historical and conceptual matter-there have been not
one, but several First Amendments. In that case, the fact that the
current First Amendment betrays conservative inclinations while
its predecessor proclaimed more progressive propensities is a con-
tingent historical development no more mysterious or obscure than
the fact that the framers' First Amendment was essentially populist
and, thus, deeply majoritarian.15 The answer to the supposed
historical conundrum might be nothing more profound than the
observation that things change.
Of course, the more interesting and important question is,
"Why do things change?" It is the more interesting question
because the answer might provide clues to our own future. It is
the more imporant question because the nature of the account or
explanation of how we ended up with a First Amendment of this
particular conservative tilt will affect our judgment about what
cultural or epistemic conditions might allow reconstruction. I want
to suggest several slightly different accounts, each of which high-
lights a different dimension of the historical dynamic of free
speech.
Consider, first, the First Amendment's rich normative and
conceptual potential. As Steve Shiffrin reminds us, there are "a
host of First Amendment values" that include liberty, equality,
self-realization, respect, dignity, autonomy, tolerance, and even
romance. 16 And, as he warns, any choice among these values entails
a substantial normative loss. Not only is society "too diverse and
too complicated to justify the expectation that monistic method-
ologies could be productive," but for many "the diversity and
complication of social reality is itself positively valued." 17 In a
related vein, I have previously suggested that "the marketplace of
ideas" metaphor was crucial to the emergence of the modern First
Amendment. With this single gestalt, Holmes evoked the autonomy
of the market, the spirited civic exchange of the public forum,
15. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 173 (2d ed. 1985) ("Eve-
rywhere unlimited liberty existed to praise the American cause . . . . '[L]iberty of speech,'
as Arthur Schlesinger so aptly said, 'belonged solely to those who spoke the speech of
liberty."').
16. See STEVEN H. SmuFFRN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5-
6 (1990).
17. Id. at 7.
SHOPPING MALL OF IDEAS
and the relativist notion of "truth" as that which succeeds in the
competitive domain of public opinion. The market metaphor thus
provided the conceptual complexity necessary to sustain the kind
of robust legal development characteristic of modern First Amend-
ment jurisprudence."
From this more conceptually pluralist perspective, the conser-
vative tilt of contemporary free speech doctrine can be seen as the
direct consequence of its contraction to an exclusive concern with
autonomy. To the extent that this account is correct, it corroborates
Schauer's intuition that principles have political tilt. Indeed, the
reduction of a complex area of law to a single principle, purpose,
or policy is a tried and true method for narrowing its scope and
reorienting its political valence. Consider in this regard the way in
which the current Court has employed an exclusive focus on
deterrence to narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment's exclu-
sionary rule.' 9
But this conceptual account of change in First Amendment
law is only partially correct because it is incomplete in two im-
portant respects. First, it fails to consider the relevance of social
context. It is frequently the case that an idea which seemed work-
able or congenial in one setting proves counterproductive or harm-
ful in another. The invention of modern standing law is a good
example. In the hands of its original creators, it seemed a promising
device for protecting progressive legislation from the predations of
the Lochner era Court. In the hands of the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, the very same concept has proved a lethal weapon capable
of decimating entire classes of constitutional rights by rendering
them unenforceable.20 Moreover, the reverse political valence of
current standing law is not a function of manipulation in a vulgar
legal realist manner, but the direct and predictable product of the
analytic structure of the doctrine. 2'
This is the real thrust of Jack Balkin's point about the ideo-
logical drift of the First Amendment. When the federal judiciary.
is using its injunctive power forcibly to prevent labor unions from
organizing, protesting, and striking, the First Amendment's auton-
18. Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1186-91 (1989).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-13 (1984).
20. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1452-78 (1988).
21. Id. at 1468-70 (discussing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982)).
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omy principle is a powerful progressive weapon. But when the
target of progressive efforts expands to the terms and conditions
of social life-to the way in which entrenched power arrangements
structure one's very preferences, perceptions and abilities-then the
public/private distinction embedded in the autonomy principle will
prove a potent political obstacle. As the character of social conflicts
change, the political tilt of a concept or position may be reversed
or transformed beyond recognition.
The basic point is that one simply cannot speak about meaning
in isolation from context. 22 To take another example, consider
Professor Schauer's analytically sound point that government neu-
trality toward free speech and formal guarantees of freedom of
expression do not yield equality of access to the means of com-
munication. But it does not follow that a regime of strict govern-
mental equality always favors the interests of the powerful. In the
context of the civil rights protests or the anti-war demonstrations
of the 1960s, the high public dramas of moral conflict and Oedipal
rebellion, respectively, all but insured the protestors' access to the
nightly news. In that context, progressive forces did not need a
22. The problem is not that Schauer ignores context altogether, but that he under-
stands context literally and simplistically as an external condition that may affect meaning
at the margins. This allows him to acknowledge that context sometimes matters, but then
to proceed as if it did not. Thus, Schauer explains in a footnote that the claim that concepts
have "quite deep and relatively fixed political structure" does not entirely discount the role
of context. Schauer, supra note 4, at 944 n.44. Nevertheless, he proceeds to compare
concepts to objects cast in steel: "True, the steel could have been used to make a locomotive
rather than a bridge, but once the bridge is made it is quite difficult to turn it into a
locomotive." Id. at 945 n.44. However, as I explore in the next few paragraphs of text,
what Schauer fails to recognize is that context problematizes and destabilizes meaning
because it is integral to meaning. See infra text accompanying notes 22-32.
The analogy betweeen meaning and a steel bridge is apt only if one ascribes to a highly
reified view of language, as Schauer in fact does. See Steven L. Winter, Confident, But
Still Not Positive, 25 CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993) (identifying this demonstrably
mistaken view of language as the fundamental problem of Schauer's positivism). Indeed,
the analogy seems plausible because it is an instantiation of the basic conceptual metaphor
MEAS ARE OBJECTS. Steven L. Winter, Death Is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARv. L.
REv. 745, 753-57 (1992) (recounting the evidence which demonstrates that this metaphor is
a vital and stable part of our conceptual system). But ideas do not have all the qualities
of rigidity and inflexibility characteristic of concrete objects; to think so is to commit the
fallacy of reification. See id. at 759. To recast Schauer's analogy, meaning is more like a
steel bridge on a planet where the ambient air temperature is about 1450 degrees Celsius.
A few degrees more and the bridge will start to droop; should the temperature reach 1500
degrees Celsius, the resulting mass of molten steel could be turned into a locomotive quite
easily.
To put the point another way, note how easily the meaning of the steel bridge analogy
changed just by specifying context. Like the steel bridge analogy, Schauer's reified view of
language seems plausible only because he presupposes the existing, unspecified context.
Quite literally, he takes it for granted.
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substantive right of access. Conversely, the resort to old fashioned
state repression by the powers-that-be of the period meant that
the First Amendment's autonomy principle was a valuable and
effective ally of progressive forces. Today, in the absence of
sustained public attention, progressive forces are left in the dis-
advantageous position of formally free but substantively unequal
competition in a very expensive media marketplace.
The second thing left out of a purely conceptual account is
an explanation of how a concept acquires content to begin with.
This leads us into heavily contested philosophical territory. But I
take it as a postulate of our post-Wittgensteinian, postmodern
period that, as Charles Taylor says: "The basic relation is that
ideas articulate practices .... That is, the ideas frequently arise
from attempts to formulate and bring to some conscious expression
the underlying rationale of ... [existing] pattern[s of behavior]." 23
What is interesting here is that this insight radicalizes the point
about the relationship between meaning and context. Thus, on
further examination, the two things left out of our earlier concep-
tual account of change turn out to be the very same thing: The
conceptual content and political valence of the First Amendment
change over time because the larger meaning-conferring context
changes constantly.
In the few moments that remain, let me sketch some examples
of this process in the development of the right of freedom of
speech. 4 Consider the contingent quality of what we so quaintly
and unquestionably refer to as "the marketplace of ideas." The
metaphor originates in Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United
States, where he argued that: "The ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
23. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF TIE SELF: THE MAnING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
204 (1989). As Taylor explains:
[M]oral ideals ... for the most part exist in our lives through being embedded
in practices. By 'practices' I mean ... more or less any stable configuration of
shared activity, whose shape is defined by a certain pattern of dos and don'ts....
The way we discipline our children, greet each other in the street, determine
group decisions through voting in elections, and exchange things through markets
are all practices ...
As articulations, ideas are in an important sense secondary to or based on
patterns. A pattern can exist just in the dos and don'ts that people accept and
mutually enforce, without there being (yet) an explicit rationale. And as children,
we learn some of the most fundamental patterns at first just as such. The
articulations come later.
Id.
24. Here, I am condensing a more detailed argument that is elaborated upon in
Winter, supra note 18, at 1183-95, 1224-32.
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power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market .. "23 Given the similarity of the market practices of
Holmes's day and ours, the "marketplace of ideas" seems a natural
and self-evident metaphor for the freedom of speech idea. Indeed,
we can only wonder why it took so long to emerge.
An important part of the answer is that, although the market
metaphor was long available to free speech partisans, it did not
always bear the same meaning. To take a famous example, Milton's
seventeenth century polemic, the Areopagitica, was written during
an era of imperial mercantilism. Milton invoked the market met-
aphor in his defense of free speech, but he used it to deride the
notion of licensed printing: "Truth and understanding are not such
wares as to be monopoliz'd and traded in by tickets and statutes,
and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity
of all knowledge in the Land, to mark and license it like our broad
cloath, and wooll packs." '26
As Fred Schauer and Stanley Fish both point out, for enlight-
enment intellectuals and their predecessors (like Milton), the driving
force behind the ideal of freedom of speech was a strong concept
of "Truth" and its inevitable victory over error and falsehood.
Thus, in a famous passage, Milton argued that "though all the
windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, Truth be
in the field .... Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew
Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encounter. ' 27 Here,
Milton has employed the conventional metaphor RATIONAL AR-
GUMENT IS WAR2 which, in his mind, insures ultimate victory:
"For who knows not that Truth is strong next to the Almighty;
she needs no policies no stratagems, nor licensings to make her
victorious; Those are the shifts and defences that error use against
her power: give her but room, and do not bind her. .... -29 Indeed,
Milton's only concern is with the danger of restraint. "Truth is
compar'd in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow
not in a perpetuall progression, they sick'n into a muddy pool of
conformity and tradition."30 Not surprisingly, the operative met-
25. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
26. John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To
the Parliament of England, in THE PROSE OF JOHN MELTON 265, 303-04 (J.M. Patrick ed.,
1967) (1644) (all spellings as in original).
27. Id. at 327.
28. GEORoE LAKoFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE BY 52-53 (1980).
29. Milton, supra note 26, at 327-28.
30. Id. at 310.
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aphor for this conception of free speech is the "free flow of
ideas. "
If the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor only makes sense
after the development of laissez faire capitalism, it is equally true
that the rise of classical liberalism, with its commitment to the
relativity of value, undermines Milton's faith in the power of
"Truth" to sustain itself against all comers. Thus, the discontinuity
between the framers' First Amendment, with its focus on the
prohibition of prior restraints and the introduction of truth as a
defense to charges of seditious libel,3 and the modern First Amend-
ment, with its more libertarian emphasis, is a function of the
radically different social contexts and the distinctive concepts they
each make possible. As Leonard Levy suggests: "Neither freedom
of speech nor freedom of the press could become a civil liberty
until people believed that the truth of their opinions, especially
their religious opinions, was relative rather than absolute .. "32
Thus, the modern First Amendment is a contingent historical
development made possible by the rise of liberalism and laissez
faire in the late nineteenth century.
I suggested earlier that a good explanation of how we got
where we are might provide clues to our future. The social con-
tingency of the assumptions and understandings that underlie First
Amendment doctrine suggest that contemporary free speech theory
does indeed face a serious crisis. As we gather here in the final
decade of the twentieth century, the postindustrial processes of
bureaucratization, consumerization, commercialization, and mass
media saturation threaten substantially to transform our experience
of the market. The Athenian agora is now the local shopping mall.
As my colleague Steve Schnably points out: "The mall is not
simply an agglomeration of stores, but a carefully planned envi-
ronment designed to create a total experience by which we are
expected to define ourselves as consumers.'"" The mall, moreover,
is populated by a relatively ubiquitous and unchanging series of
franchises with suspiciously postmodern names like The Gap, The
Limited, Victoria's Secret, and the more politically ominous Ba-
nana Republic.
These developments are not politically neutral. As Mary Becker
points out, they have a particularly real and deleterious effect on
31. LEvy, supra note 15, at 198-205.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory
of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REv. 347, 388 (1993).
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women.3 4 They also have implications for free speech doctrine. In
this commercial context, the really grave problem is not that the
autonomy principle underlying the First Amendment may have a
hidden conservative tilt. It is that, in the age of pervasive consumer
conformity, the notion of autonomy may itself come to seem
incoherent. Reliance on the "free trade in ideas" as the bulwark
of democracy and self-government seems vacuous when the "dis-
tinct tyranny of late twentieth century America" is a homogeneous
corporate culture that thrives on the public's "insatiable appetite
for amusement" 35 and its apparently unceasing need for ever more
uniform badges of consumer status. 36 In short, the real danger is
not that the First Amendment may turn out to be a false friend,
but that it may leave us with the political and intellectual equivalent
of fast food.
The danger, I hasten to add, is not merely speculative; the
harbingers are already here. Speech is now a primary product of
entire bureaucracies that design, market, and disseminate images
and other symbolic forms through ever faster means of commu-
nication like the fax and the modum. As Professor Schauer ob-
serves, the Enlightenment notion that true ideas have some natural
advantange in the deliberative process seems "somewhere between
fragile and false" given the realities of contemporary marketing
practices .37 In Washington, corporations and trade associations
now hire agencies to orchestrate "spontaneous" outpourings of
grass-roots sentiment in forms that make it impossible for elected
officials to identify as manufactured. 38 The refrain so familiar
from the technological age-"is it live, or is it Memorex?"-has
now been recast to suit the postmodern age of instantaneous,
massed-produced public opinion. "[A]s they put it in the lobbying
industry: is it grass roots or is it Astro Turf."39 Undoubtedly, only
Ronald Reagan's hairdresser knows for sure.
34. Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review,
64 U. COLO. L. REv. 975 (1993).
35. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of
Paratroopers, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1087, 1088 (1990).
36. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, REVENGE OF THE CRYSTAL: SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE MOD-
ERN OBJECT AND ITS DESTINY, 1968-1983, at 75-76 (P. Foss & J. Pefanis eds., 1990).
37. Schauer, supra note 4, at 953.
38. Stephen Engelberg, A New Breed of Hired Hands Cultivates Grass-Roots Anger,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1993, at Al.
39. Id.
